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THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT UNDER EMC'S POLICY 
IT IS REQUIRED TO PAY THE COSTS AND FEES ASSESSED AGAINST ITS 
INSURED RIMAR CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, EVEN WHEN THE 
COMPENSATORY DAMAGES ARE NOT COVERED UNDER THE POLICY 
Issue presented: The issue presented is whether the "supplementary payments" section of 
the EMC lx)licy (Exhibit I, pp. 7, 8)1 entities the insured, Rimar Construction, Inc. ("RCI"), to 
indemnification for any costs/fees assessed against it irrespective of coverage for compensatory 
damages assessed. An Idaho case is good authority for the conclusion that, irrespective of coverage 
for the assessed damages, the "supplementary payments" section of the EMC policy does provide 
coverage for fees and costs ("supplementary payments"). Mutual of Enumclaw v. Harvey, 115 Idaho 
1009,772 P.2d 216 (1989). 
Mutual of Enumclaw is not distinguishable: Under the heading "Supplementary Payments 
Coverages A and B" [Coverage A is for "property damage liability], the EMC policy recites: "We 
will pay, with respect to any claim we investigate or settle, or any "suit" against an insured we 
defend:. . . (e) all costs taxed against the insured in the 'suit:"'. (Exhibit I, pp. 1,7,8). 
In Mutual of Enumclaw, relevant language of the Enumclaw policy stated: "Supplementary 
Coverages 2. (Personal Liability Claims, Expenses) a. all expenses incurred by Company and costs 
taxed against the insured in any suit defended by the Company". ld., 115 Idaho 1112. Mutual of 
Enumclaw held that this coverage was "separate from and in addition to the basic policy coverage", 
i.e" the absence of coverage with respect to assessed damages did not prevent this coverage for fees 
and ~osts from attaching. 
I A portion of the clerk's record is not paginated, including exhibits to the Affidavit of James 
Reid. Unless otherwise noted, reference to "exhibits" is to those exhibits attached to the Reid affidavit. 
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EMC argues that, coverage for assessed costs in its policy is contingent upon the existence 
of coverage for damages" because the language 'supplementary payments' indicates that payments 
will only be made in addition to payments on the underlying claim" . Appellant's Reply Brief, p. 
2. The problem with that argument is that, as applied to the section of Enumclaw policy entitled 
"Supplementary Coverages" the Mutual of Enumclaw Court should have found coverage did not 
exist for fees because, borrowing EMC's argument, the language "supplementary coverages" 
indicates that coverage for fees will exist only if there is coverage for the underlying claim. The 
Court in Enumclaw found to the contrary. 115 Idaho at 1012, 1013. The Court noted that 
"'Supplementary Coverages' implies that the provisions contained therein are separate from and in 
addition to the basic policy coverage to the basic policy coverage . . ." Id, 115 Idaho at 1112. 
There is good reason, semantically and logically, that the same interpretation should be made with 
respect to the "Separate Payments" phrase in the EMC policy. 
EMC's also argues that it does not have liability for Donnellys' fees, because that liability 
is conditioned upon a suit existing and "suit" is defined as a "civil proceeding" . . . to which this 
insurance applies" Exhibit I, p. 15. para. 18. The defect in this argument is that, by providing a 
defense to RCI, EMC has conceded that the Donnellys had filed a civil proceeding "to which this 
insurance applies". 
It is notable as well that the EMC policy recites under "Supplementary Payments": "These 
payments "vill not reduce the limits of insurance". Exhibit I, p. 8. In the Mutual of Enumclaw 
policy, the Idaho Supreme Court observed similar language in the Enumclaw policy, i.e., "shall not 
reduce the applicable limit ofliability", "implies that the provisions contained therein are separate 
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from and in addition to the basic policy coverage . . and Enumclaw's obligation to pay such costs 
is unaffected by the fact that the policy does not cover Oakes' [the insured] intentionally tortious 
conduct".Id., 115 Idaho at 1012. 
Mintarsih and Mutual of Enumclaw concur that the duty to pay assessed costs and fees is co-
extensive with the duty to defend: In State Farm v. Mintarsih, 175 CaI.App. 274, 95 CaI.Rptr.3d 845 
(App. 20(9), relied on by EMC, the Court re-affirmed earlier authority that the duty to pay costs and 
fees under the "supplemental payments" coverage is triggered by the duty to defend, not the duty to 
State Farm agreed to pay "expenses we incur and costs taxed against 
an Insured in suits we defend," under the terms of the homeowners 
policy. Under the terms of the umbrelIa polky, State Farm agreed to 
pay "the expenses we incur and costs taxed against you in suits we 
defend," provided that the claim or suit was not covered by any other 
policy. These provisions made the insurer's obligation to pay an 
award of costs against the insured dependent on the defense duty. 
Courts have interpreted the word "costs" as used in such a provision 
consistent with its use in Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5, 
subdivision (a)(1 0), which provides that attorney fees authorized by 
contract, statute, or law are allowable as costs to the prevailing party 
under section 1032. (Prichard v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. (2000) 84 
Cal. App. 4th 890, 912 (Prichard); Insurance Co. Of North America v. 
National American Ins. Co. (1995) 37 Cal. App. 4th 195,206-207.) 
2 In the Donnellys' opening brief, they cited Arrowood Indemnity v. Travelers Indemnity, 118 
Cal.App. 1452, 116 Cal.Rptr.3d 559 (2010) as being on point. It has been correctly observed by 
oppusing counsel t~lat a petition for rehearing was granted in Arrowood and that case is not citable. 
Counsel was misled by the page references in "Cal.App." and "Cal.Rptr." Donnellys' counsel withdraws 
all reference to Arrowood and apologizes to the Court for this inadvertence. Donnellys' counsel has been 
advised by handling counsel that Arrowood has settled. 
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175 Cal. App. 4th at 284 (emphasis added). 
The Mintarsih case (California) cited by plaintiffEMC is distinguishable by the underlying 
facts: PlaintiffEMC places heavy reliance on State Farm v. Mintarsih, supra" and is asking this 
Court to accept Mintarsih as presenting the same factual posture as the case at bench. (Reply Brief, 
pp. 4 - 8). Unlike the case at bench, Mintarsih presents an issue of "mixed" claims, i.e., litigation 
alleging undisputedly covered and uncovered claims with each respective claim having a separate 
factual setting with the fee entitlement attaching solely to uncovered claims. In the case at bench, 
both tort claims (covered) and contract claims (uncovered) carry a fee entitlement and arise out of 
the same factual setting See footnote 3, infra. 
Cmtrary to EMC' s brief (p. 7), the amended complaint neither alleges nor prays for bodily 
injury damages. (Exhibit Band EMC's reservation of rights letter of September 7, 2007 at p. 3). 
However, the amended complaint does allege a covered liability, i.e., that in constructing the 
"addition", the underlying defendant RCI, "compromised the integrity of the original home", and 
alleged loss of use. R. Exhibit B, para. lO(a). In its reservation of rights letters, EMC has conceded 
that "physical injury to tangible property" is covered under the policy. See Exhibit I, (pp. 3, 4 of 
September 5, 2006, letter and pp. 4,5 of September 7, 2007, letter). However, EMC erroneously 
states in the letters that "there are no allegations of physical injury to tangible property". ld., p. 4 to 
September 5, 2006, letter and p. 5 to September 7, 2007, letter. Ignoring the property damages 
alleged in the amended complaint, EMC bases its proffered defense on the carbon monoxide 
exposure to Kathy Donnelly described in the amended complaint (Exhibit B, para. lOCk), p. 5.), for 
which damages are neither alleged nor prayed for. 
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Again, EMC concedes that the amended complaint does not include a claim for bodily il1iury 
(Ie!., Exhibit I, p. 3 of September 7,2007, letter). Nonetheless, EMC continues to hang its duty to 
defend on this so-called bodily il1iury claim, Jd., p. 7, of September, 2007, letter. 
Unlike the covered tort claims in Mintarsih, this covered liability (property damage) does 
entitle the DonneHys to attorney fees from the insured/defendant,3 By erroneously advising this 
Court that the allegations of the Donnellys' amended complaint include "bodily injury claims" 
(which do not carry an attorney fee entitlement) EMC is wrongly attempting to place the case at 
bench on all fours with Mintarsih (Appellant's Reply Brief, pp. 6 - 8). 
The Mintarsih Court ruled, with Solomnic fairness, that an insurance company which 
provides a defense respecting certain covered claims (with no attorney fee entitlement) should not 
be penalized for that defense by sticking it with attorney fees as to claims, in that same litigation, 
which are not covered and which have a different factual basis. That is, the plaintiff's claimed 
attorney fees in Mintarsih were only with respect to the wage and hour claim which had a separate 
factual basis from the tort claims upon which the plaintiff prevailed. Jd., 175 Cal. App. 4th at 287. 
In the case at bench, because the allegations in the Amended Complaint sound both in tort 
and contract, concerning the same factual basis, there was the "potential for coverage", and EMC 
was obligated to defend and, by Mutual of Enumclaw, pay any attorney fees and costs assessed 
against its insured, RCI. 
3 Where tortious conduct results in property damage in a commercial setting, such conduct does 
not preclude the plaintiffs entitlement to fees under Idaho Code § 12-120(3). City of McCall v. Buxton, 
146 Idaho 656, 665,201 P.3d 629 (2009), citing Blimka v. My Web Wholesaler, 143 Idaho 723, 728. 
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THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT. UNDER THE EMC POLICY. EMC 
HAD NO DUTY TO INDEMNIFY ITS INSURED FOR DAMAGES ARISING FROM 
BREACH OF THE IMPLIED WARRANTY OF (GOOD) WORKMANSHIP 
The inry did not find that RCI was negligent because the jury was never asked whether RCI 
was negligent: Contrary to EMC's argument, the entire array of jury questions need to be examined 
to ascertain whether coverage issues have been clarified.. For example, the jury found there was a 
contract breach but failed to award the Donnellys contract damages. Exhibit E, pp. 2, 7. The award 
of damages for breach of the implied warranty, ($126,611.55) was not, therefore, an award of 
contract damages. An instruction to the jury advised them that an implied warranty "is an obligation 
imposed by the law when there has been no representation or promise." Exhibit D, Instruction No. 
48. As noted below, the evolution of the concept of implied warranty is not rooted in principles of 
contract law. 
The Donnelly's recognize that, under the EMC policy, there was no coverage for damages 
arising from breach of contract. However, there was coverage for loss of use of property that had 
been "physically injured" and which property was outside the scope of the contract. Stated 
differently, if the property which was damaged was property being constructed by RCI, this damage 
constitutes a breach of contract for which there is no insurance coverage. However, if there is 
"physical injury to tangible property", the EMC policy does provide coverage. The reservation of 
rights letters, assert, incorrectly, that "there are no allegations of physical injury to tangible property". 
Exhibit I, p. 4, 2006 letter, p. 4, 5, 2007 letter. In fact, the Amended Complaint alleges that during 
the construction of the "addition", "compromise[d]' "the integrity of the original home"". Exhibit 
B, p. 3. para. 10(a). Included in the alleged bases ofliability was "negligence". Id 
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Finally, EMC tests the patience of this Court when it argues in its Reply Brief:" ... [T]he 
JUry found no liability, and awarded no damages as to the tort claims based on fraud, 
misrepresentation, nondisclosure, professional malpractice and negligence" . Id., p. 10. In fact, the 
jury was never presented with the question whether RCI committed negligence. Notwithstanding 
there were six jury questions regarding tort liability, the jury questions did not include a question as 
to RCI's negligence, the only tort alleged for which there was coverage. That is, the jury was never 
asked about RCI' s negligence. Exhibit E. Also, see infra re the failure ofEMC' s attorneys to request 
an allocated verdict. 
Whether the errors in the reservation of rights letters were inadvertent or intentional, EMC 
is now invoking these letters as evidence of non-coverage: (1) Phantom "bodily injury" claim: EMC 
now asserts that the reservation of rights letters were based upon Kathy Donnelly's exposure to 
carbon monoxide fumes and the fact that bodily injury claims are covered under the EMC policy. 
Hence, the reservation of rights letters and the defense provided to EMC. This justification does not 
pass muster. 
Fi~'st, the Donnellys never made a claim for personal injuries. More to the point, and as 
conceded by EMC, the Donnellys never alleged personal injuries in the complaint or amended 
complaint and never included a prayer for damages for personal injuries. Exhibit I (September, 
2007, letter, p. 3). Why provide RCI the defense? 
Secondly, EMC acknowledges that the so-called personal injuries occurred in 2005, shortly 
after the conclusion of RCI's work for the Donnellys. Id. p. 3. At the time EMC sent the 2007 
reservation of rights letter, the purported claim for personal injuries had expired or was about to 
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expire under Idaho Code 5-219(4) i.e., a two year limitations period of personal injuries. Why 
provide RCl the defense? 
Thirdly, in an attempt to make Mintarsih germane, EMC represents to this Court that Kathy 
Donnelly's "bodily injury" claim was dismissed by the Court in the underlying action. Appellant 
Brief, pp. 7, 8; Appellant Reply, p. 8. There was no motion to dismiss and there was no dismissal. 
There was an Order in Limine cautioning the Donnellys not mention Kathy Donnelly'S sickness 
during the underlying trial. Exhibit C, pp. 2, 3. 
(2) EMC ignores covered property damage liability: Prior to the issuance of the second 
reservation of rights letter (September 7, 2007) EMC gained knowledge that the RCI's construction 
work on the new porch was creating structural problems with the "original home" which was not the 
subject of the RCI contract. Just prior to the filing of the amended complaint, EMC's claims 
adjusters noted: 
Under para 10 it appear they are saying that the improperly const. 
addition and porches has compromised the original structure in that 
it is buckling walls, breaking windows, causing the roof line to sag 
and other problems-this is new info [7111/07]. 
R. D. 267 
Two months after receiving the amended complaint and making the entry identified in the 
preceding quotation, the September 2007, reservation of rights letter advised RCI: "Here there are 
no allegations of physical injury to tangible property. . . . [T]here is neither property damage 
nor an occurrence alleged with regard to construction defects". Exhibit I, September, 2007, pp. 5, 
6. 
A cynical person might speculate that EMC identified a phantom covered claim ("bodily 
CROSS-APPELLANTS/RESPONDENTS' REPLY BRIEF - 9 
injury") to justifY controlling RCI's defense, includingjury interrogatories, without disclosure of the 
real :-eason for providing a defense ("property damage"). Whether inadvertent or otherwise, EMC, 
through its defense counsel, failed to submit to the jury an allocated verdict, e.g., an interrogatory 
as to whether RCI was negligent, which would have clarified the coverage issues without disclosing 
to the jury the existence of insurance. The absence of an allocated verdict imposed upon RCI and 
the Donnelly,> the impossible task of persuading the district court as to the jury's collective mindset 
respecting the damages awarded for breach of the implied warranty of workmanship. 
The damages awarded the Donnellys arise from a breach of the implied warranty of 
workmanship and are not rooted in contract but, historically, arises by operation of law to insure a 
fair result. Such remedy is not dependent on the existence of a promise or contract. Exhibit D, 
Instruction Nos. 48, 49; Calamari on Contracts (Third Edition, West), §12-1, p. 19. 
The dutv imposed upon an insurer with respect to allocated verdicts: In view of the jury 
verdict against an award of contract damages and the failure of EMC, through retained defense 
counsel, to request an allocated verdict, the compensatory damages should be deemed to be covered 
damages lmder the EMC policy. EMC has provided a semantical discussion on the differences 
between a "special" verdict and "general" verdict (Appellant Reply Brief, pp. 12-15). However, 
EMC has failed to identifY in which particulars the underlying verdict was an allocated verdict, 
addressing coverage issues and in which particulars EMC discharged its duty to the insured under 
Buckley v. Orem, 112 Idaho 117, 730 P.2d 1037 (Ct. App. 1986). That is, EMC has failed to identifY 
how the verdict shed light on the issue of insurance coverage. Buckley is not cited in its briefing. 
In Buckley v. Orem, the Appellate Court analyzed "the interplay between a particular verdict 
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form and the insurer's responsibilities when providing and directing the defense of its insured in the 
injury action". Id 112 Idaho at 123. Both Buckley and its primary authority, Duke v. Hoch, 468 
F.2d 973 (5 th Cir., 1972), dealt with ambiguities in an unallocated verdict having to do with the 
available insurance limits. By contrast, the ambiguity in the Donnelly/RCI verdict concerned the 
basis ofliability. However, in both Buckley/Duke and the case at bench, the insured or, alternatively, 
the judgment creditor, is put to the same "impossible burden" of persuading a second court of what 
the jury intended by its verdict: 
[A]t the merits trial [the insurer's] counsel was required to make 
known to the insured[ s] the availability of a special verdict and the 
divergence of interest between [the insureds] and the insurer 
springing from whether damages were or were not allocated. The 
record before us does not indicate that counsel did so. 
Since on the present record the insurer failed to fully advise its 
insureds of the divergence of interest between it and them with 
respect to the verdict, the insureds [and the judgment creditor, Duke] 
must, subject to the possibility noted in part III, infra, be freed of the 
impossible burden (ifproofplaced on them. 
Duke v. Hoch, 468 F.2d at 979,980 (emphasis added). 
Disposition: In Duke and Buckley, the remedy for an unallocated verdict was to remand the 
matter on the issue "whether the insurer's counsel, as counsel having the right to control the defense, 
had adequately disclosed the situation to the insured's own counsel". Buckley, 112 Idaho at 124. 
Upon remand, ruled the Buckley court, "further proof is necessary to show whether Nationwide [the 
insurer] fuByand fairly handled its defense responsibilities to the Orems [the insureds] in light of 
known rigks". Id. 
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However, in Buckley, the Court madc it clear that in the future it adopted the Duke standard 
respecting the conduct by an insurer: "Henceforth an insurer's duty in this regard shall be as 
extensi ve as that outlined in Duke". Id, 112 Idaho at 125. In that case, "the district court was 
instructecl that "[i]fthe insurer could not make such showing [that there was adequate disclosure to 
the insured], then the district court was instructed to 'face the issue of attempting retrospectively to 
allocate tl1e damages awarded.'" 468 F.2d at 984". Buckley, 112 Idaho at 124 (bracketed material 
explanatory). 
In the case at bench, there is no evidence that EMC complied with its duty, as mandated by 
Buckley, in either its reservation of rights letters (Exhibit I) or elsewhere. That duty is described as 
follows: 
[W]hen the insurer sought to limit its liability to the coverage 
provided by the contract, the insurer was required to show that it had 
faithfully and fully performed its responsibilities to its insured by 
disclosing the need for an allocated verdict. 
Id., 112 Idaho at 124. 
In addition, to EMC's failure to disclose to its insured the need for an allocated verdict, there 
are other factors, as noted above, for concluding that breach of warranty damages are a covered 
liability: (1) with a curious lack of candor, EMC based its duty to defend on a non-existent bodily 
injili)' claim, ignoring the allegations of property damage covered under the policy; (Exhibit I); (2) 
the breach of implied warranty claim (for which damages were assessed) is not rooted in contract 
law (Exhibit D, Instruction Nos. 48 and 49); and (3) the jury found no contract damages (Exhibit E, 
p. 7), which damCl.ges, in any event, are not a covered liability. 
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UNDER IDAHO CODE §41-1839, THE DONNELLYS ARE THE 
PREVAILING PAR TIES BECAUSE THE AMOUNT A WARDED BY THE 
TRIAL COURT WAS GREATER THAN THE AMOUNT TENDERED BY EMC 
Preliminary note: The district court's analysis of the proof ofloss issue and Donnellys' status 
as non-insureds assumes their status as prevailing parties. R. pp. 541-547. In order for the district 
court to be reversed on this point requires a showing of an abuse of discretion. 
Issues pertaining to proof ofloss and Donnellys' status as a non-insured: Following EMC"s 
suit, the Donnellys reference their Respondents' Brief, pages 34 through 39. It should be noted that 
the underlying judgment creditor (not the insured) in Mutual of Enumclaw v. Harvey, supra, had 
standing to recover portions ofthe judgment, including attorney fees pursuant to § 41-1839. Id., 115 
Idaho at 1011, 1015. Also, Mutual of Enumclaw held that, where the insurer denies liability, it 
waives the requirement that proof ofloss be furnished as a prerequisite to recovery of attorney fees. 
Id 115 Idaho at 10 15. 
EMC erroneously applies the "prevailing party' standard under Rule 54(d)((1) rather than 
the applicable standard under Idaho Code §41-1839: The authorities cited in EMC's Reply Brief 
pertain to the trial court's application of the "prevailing party" concept as set forth in Rule 54( d)(1), 
LR.C.P., the awarding of fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Code §§12-120 and 12-121, e.g., Joseph 
CL. U Assoc. v. Vaught, 117 Idaho 555, 789 P.2d 1146 (Ct.App. 1990). See Reply brief, p. 19. 
In the context ofIdaho Code §41-183 9, in order to be awarded attorney fees, the claimant 
need only recover more than was tendered by the insurance company in order to be the "prevailing 
party": 
When an insurer fails to tender the amount justly due under an 
insurance policy, within thirty days after receiving proof ofloss. I.C. 
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§41-1839(1) mandates an award of reasonable attorney fees to the 
insured. To be entitled to such an award, consequently, an insured 
must prevail. [cases cited] However, the il13ured need not obtain a 
verdict for the full amount requested. The insured need only be 
awarded an amount greater than that tendered by the insurer. 
Slaathaug v. Allstate Insurance Co., 132 Idaho 705, 711, 979 P.2d 107 (1999). 
EMC cites Slaathaug in connection with a Rule 59( e) motion, not in connection with 
Donnellys' attorney fee entitlement. 
EMC initiated this action during the underlying litigation between the Donnellys and RCI, 
and this declaratory judgment action has been ongoing since that time. It is undisputed that the 
amount awarded to the Donnellys, i.e., $296,933.89 in costs and fees assessed against the insured 
RCI, had never been tendered by EMC, the insurer. Hence the DonneUys' entitlement to attorney 
fees and costs. 
IN THE EVENT THE DONNELLY'S ARE ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY 
FEES IN THE DISTRICT COURT PROCEEDINGS. THEY 
ARE ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES ON THIS APPEAL 
In Slaathaug v. Allstate Ins., supra, the Supreme Court declined to address attorney fees on 
appeal because that decision had not yet been reached by the district court. Depending on the 
decisio:i1 as to an award of attorney fees in the proceedings below, such decision will determine 
whether the insured is entitled to fees on appeal. 
. . . [T]here have been no findings as to whether § 41-1839(1) mandated an award 
offees in the litigation below. Absent such a finding, it would be premature to award 
fees under this section on appeal. Whether the Slaathaugs are entitled to attorney 
fees below will determine whether they are entitled to fees for defending this appeal. 
CF. JR. Simplot Co. V Enviro-Clear Co., Inc., [132] Idaho [251],970 P.2d 980 
(1998) (remanding a case for a new trial and holding a request for attorney fees on 
appeal under § 12-120(3) to be premature since neither party could have yet 
prevailed).Id, 
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J 32 Idaho at 711 (emphasis added)(bracketed material explanatory). 
CONCLUSION 
EMC's obligation to pay costs and fees assessed against its insured. Contrary to EMC's 
asse!iion, Mt!tual a/Enumclaw holds that EMC is required to pay such fees and costs by reason of 
the "Supplementary Payments" section of its insurance policy. Slate Farm v. Minitarsih, although 
djstinguishable from the case at bench on the facts corroborates Mutual a/Enumclaw, on this point, 
i. e., the obligation to pay costs/fees arises where the insurer has a duty to defend. State Farm v. 
Mintarsih, 175 Cal.App.4th at 285. 
In its attempt to characterize Mintarsih as being on point, EMC wrongfully attributes to the 
underlying amended complaint an allegation of "bodily injury". In its reservation of rights letters, 
EMC consedes that the pleadings do not include such a claim. Exhibit 1. The district court in the 
underlying litigation did not "dismiss" a bodily injury claim; rather it ordered that the Donnellys 
could not reference Kathy Donnelly's sickness during trial. Exhibit C, pp. 2, 3. EMC has 
erroneously represented to the Court that the claim was "dismissed". Appellant Brief, pp. 7, 8; 
Appellant's Reply Brief, p. 8. 
EMC's obligation to pay the underlying damage award: It cannot be seriously disputed that 
the underlying verdict is not an allocated verdict. The closest the verdict comes to clarifYing the 
coverage issues is the answer that there are no contract damages, which is not a covered liability. 
Exhibit E, p. 7. Buckley v. Orem places a burden on the insurer to "disclose the need for an 
allocated verdict", Id, 112 Idaho at 124. 
Thert is no evidence that such disclosure occurred. It is certainly not included in the 
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reservation of rights letters (Exhibit I). This omission coupled with EMC's phantom "bodily injury" 
claim as a pretext for providing a defense as well as jury verdict of no contract damages requires a 
conclusion that the implied warranty of workmanship damages is a covered liability for which the 
insurer EMC is obligated to indemnifY RCI for the benefit of the Donnellys. 
The Donnellys are entitled to attorney fees both in the district court proceedings and in this 
~<!l: The Donnellys are the prevailing parties respecting their claim for attorney fees and costs 
assessed against the insured RCI in the underlying litigation. This "prevailing party" status is 
acquired under Idaho Code §41-1839 because the Donnellys prevailed respecting the assessed 
fees/costs which amount was never tendered by EMC. Slaathaug v. Allstate, supra. 
Respectfully submitted this 19th day of December, 2011. 
Attorney for Respondent/Cross-Appellant 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 19th day of December, 2011, I caused to be served two 
true and correct ~0pies of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to 
the following: 
James G. Reid 
David P. Claiborne 
Ringert Law Chartered 
455 South Third Street 
P.O. Box 2773 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2773 
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__ U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
X Hand delivery 
__ Overnight delivery 
__ Facsimile (342-4657) 
